Property, commodities, gold and cash

The Alternatives and Cash tabs, explained without jargon

These are the assets that do not fit neatly into shares or bonds. Some of them produce income, some produce nothing at all, and the difference matters more than anything else when working out what to expect from them.

The idea behind all of them

Every forecast here starts with the same question: what does this asset actually pay you, and what happens to that payment over time?

A property fund collects rent. An infrastructure fund collects tolls and utility bills. Cash collects interest. Those three have something to compound and their expected returns follow from the income plus whatever that income does over time.

Gold and commodities pay nothing. No rent, no interest, no earnings. Whatever you make on them comes entirely from the price changing, and that is why their forecasts cluster around inflation rather than above it. This is not a judgement about whether to own them. They can be worth holding for what they do to a portfolio in bad times rather than for what they return.

Property, or REITs

A REIT is a listed company that owns buildings and passes most of the rent to shareholders. So the forecast is the rent it pays now, plus what happens to rents over time, adjusted for interest rates.

dividend yield + rental growth + effect of rates moving

The dividend yield is the actual MSCI US REIT index yield, around 3.5 percent. Rental growth is assumed to match inflation, which is reasonable because commercial leases are commonly linked to it.

This is a correction to what the page used to do. The REIT yield was previously not a REIT yield at all. It was calculated as the 10-year Treasury yield plus 1.5 percentage points, which produced 6.18 percent when REITs were actually paying 3.55. The forecast was overstated by more than two and a half points as a result. There was also a valuation adjustment advertised in the methodology which could never do anything, because the yield was constructed from the same constant it was being compared against, so the gap between them was always exactly zero.

There is now no valuation adjustment at all. Reinstating one would need a reliable long-run REIT yield spread to revert towards and no free source for one was found, so the current gap between the REIT yield and the Treasury yield is shown on the page as information rather than being fed into the answer. At the moment REITs yield less than Treasuries, which historically has meant property is not cheap.

Infrastructure

Toll roads, water companies, power networks, pipelines. The appeal is that the charges are often set by regulators with an explicit link to inflation, so the income tends to keep up with prices without anyone having to negotiate.

dividend yield + 80% of inflation + 0.5% real growth

The yield is the actual MSCI World Infrastructure index yield, around 3.5 percent. It was previously assumed to be the 10-year Treasury plus half a point, which overstated it by more than a point and a half.

The 80 percent inflation linkage and the half point of real growth are assumptions rather than measurements. Regulated charges usually track inflation closely but not perfectly, and the assets need continual capital spending to keep working.

Commodities

Almost nobody holding commodities owns any. A commodity fund holds futures contracts and Treasury bills, and its return comes from three places: the interest on the bills, the change in commodity prices, and the cost or benefit of continually replacing expiring contracts.

Treasury bill interest + commodity prices tracking inflation

That third piece, called roll yield, is where a correction was needed. When the price of a contract for delivery next year is higher than one for delivery next month, replacing contracts costs money. That situation, contango, has been far more common than the reverse since the mid 2000s, so rolling has generally been a drag rather than a benefit.

The model previously added half a point a year for rolling. That has the sign wrong. Erb and Harvey found the average excess return of commodity futures close to zero once rolling is accounted for. It is now set to zero, which is a neutral assumption rather than a forecast of what the futures curve will do. If anything it remains generous.

Gold

Gold pays nothing. It produces no rent, no interest and no earnings, so there is no income to compound. A ten-year forecast is therefore a view about what one ounce will be worth against something else, and the whole question is what that something else should be.

This model used to answer inflation, on the reasoning that gold holds its purchasing power. Tested against the record, that reasoning does not hold up. Across ten-year windows since 1975, gold’s correlation with realised inflation is about zero. Over the sixteen years to 2026 gold returned 8.5 percent a year while US consumer prices rose 2.6 percent, so the old model would have forecast about 2.2 percent and been wrong by more than six points a year, every year.

Measured against the money supply the picture is completely different. Gold has been close to flat against broad money for fifty years while drifting upward against consumer prices, and of every measure tested the gold to money ratio was the best predictor of the next ten years of returns. So money is what gold is now anchored to.

growth in broad money
+ how far the gold to money ratio travels back to its median
- about 0.4% a year to store and insure it

Broad money here is the US, euro area, China, Japan and the UK added together and converted to dollars, which is most of the world’s money rather than all of it. Growth is measured over the trailing twenty years. The ratio is compared with its own median over thirty years.

Changing the yardstick does not make gold look cheap. Gold currently trades at roughly twice its median ratio to the money supply, which is the highest reading in thirty years. Money growing at about 6 percent a year is a tailwind, and giving back a doubling over a decade is a headwind of about the same size. They very nearly cancel. Whichever yardstick you prefer, gold has run up faster than the thing it is measured against.

That is why the three scenarios are far apart. The bull case assumes the ratio never reverts, which is the argument that central bank buying and moves away from the dollar have permanently repriced the metal, and leaves you collecting money growth. The bear case assumes the ratio returns fully to its median. The base case assumes it travels a third of the way, deliberately gentler than the fitted relationship implies, because that relationship has called gold expensive every year for a decade while gold rose.

None of this is an argument against holding gold. It is an argument against expecting a repeat of the last decade. What gold has done historically is hold its value when other things do not, and that is a different job from building wealth.

Cash

Cash pays whatever short-term interest rates happen to be, which is knowable today and unknowable in three years. The question is what they will average over your horizon.

There is a good answer to that, and it is free: the bond market has already priced it. A ten-year government bond yield is approximately what investors expect the overnight rate to average over ten years, plus a premium for tying money up for a decade. Take the premium off and you have an estimate of cash.

government bond yield for your horizon - 0.5% term premium
This replaces a number written into the code. The model used to blend today’s rate towards a fixed 2.75 percent “neutral rate” on an invented schedule. That figure was a guess, it never moved, and it ignored the yield curve entirely, which is the market’s actual opinion on the same question. The change raises the 10-year cash forecast by more than a point.

The half point term premium is itself an estimate. Published estimates move about and have occasionally been negative. It is a reasonable middling figure and nothing more precise than that.

Private equity and hedge funds

These two are different from everything else here, because neither has a market price to work from. Private equity is valued by the people who own it, a few times a year. Hedge fund index returns are self-reported by the funds themselves. So there is no yield to read and no price series to trust.

The only honest approach is to price them off what they are actually made of, which is listed companies and cash, and both are therefore derived from the forecasts elsewhere in this tool. Change the equity forecast and these change with it.

Private equity

cash + 1.2 × (US small cap return - cash)

A buyout fund is, in economic terms, listed companies with borrowed money on top. Funds add roughly fifty pence of debt for every pound of equity, which is why they move more than the stock market does. AQR settle on 1.2 times a small-cap index, about 1.3 against a broad one.

The starting index matters more than the gearing does. AQR measured the 1.2 against public small caps, so that is what it is applied to here. An earlier version pointed it at our US large cap forecast instead, which paired a small-cap beta with a large-cap return and matched neither of the two figures AQR report. Because our small cap forecast currently sits well above our large cap one, that mismatch was holding the private equity number about five points too low.

No advantage is assumed after fees, and that is the contentious part. AQR found private equity historically delivered a 1.2 beta and no net-of-fee alpha against public small caps. The gross outperformance was real; the fees consumed it. They assume total fees of about 5.7 percent a year, from a 2 percent management charge, 20 percent of profits and roughly 1.2 percent of other costs, and conclude private equity “does not seem to offer as attractive a net-of-fee return edge over public market counterparts as it did 15-20 years ago”.

Hedge funds

cash + 0.4 × (listed equity return - cash) + 0.5% alpha

Ibbotson, Chen and Zhu decomposed hedge fund returns from 1995 to 2009 into 3.0 percent of alpha, 4.7 percent from market exposure and 3.4 percent of costs. The market exposure implies a beta of roughly 0.4 to equities, which is what is used here.

The alpha assumed is half a point, far below the 3 percent measured for that period. Two reasons. It has compressed as the industry has grown, and the measured figure was flattered to begin with: the same authors found reported hedge fund returns overstated by about 5.68 percent a year once survivorship and backfill bias are removed. Funds that fail stop reporting, and funds that survive add their good early years to a database when they join it.

Forecasters disagree about these more than about anything else. On private equity over ten years, BlackRock currently expect 14.6 percent, J.P. Morgan 10.2, AQR 6.6 and Research Affiliates 3.8. That is an eleven point spread, wider even than the disagreement about US shares. Ours currently lands near J.P. Morgan, above AQR and well below BlackRock, and it gets there without assuming any skill: it is our small cap forecast geared up, with fees taken to consume whatever edge the gearing produces. That also makes it the most volatile number on this page, because it inherits everything uncertain about forecasting small caps and then multiplies it. Treat any single number here, ours included, as one opinion.

Both are also difficult or impossible for most private investors to buy at the terms these figures assume. Access to good funds is the whole game in private equity, and the dispersion between the best and worst managers is far wider than in listed markets, so an average is less meaningful than it would be for an index fund.

Bitcoin

Bitcoin is the one asset on this page we do not forecast. You enter your own number, and the tool shows reference points beside the box to help you pick it.

Every other forecast here starts from income. A property fund pays rent, a bond pays a coupon, a company pays a dividend out of earnings, and the yield you can see today does most of the work in the answer. Bitcoin pays nothing to its holders, so that arithmetic has nowhere to start. This is a property of the asset rather than a mark against it, and it is the same reason gold gets the thinnest treatment of anything above. The difference is that gold has several thousand years of price history to lean on and Bitcoin has about sixteen.

What the published models are worth

Three models get quoted often enough to be worth answering directly. Stock to flow compares the existing supply to yearly new issuance. It fits the past closely, but its explanatory power largely disappears once you control for the passage of time, because scheduled halvings and the calendar move almost in lockstep. Metcalfe style models tie value to the square of the number of users, and share the same problem of describing history better than they call the future. The power law, which fits price against time on a log scale, has the best fit of the three, and it is a fitted trend line rather than a tested forecasting model.

Independent tests at horizons of one to six months have not found a model that reliably beats the assumption that tomorrow’s price is today’s. That finding is the reason this tab asks you for a number instead of printing one.

The four reference points

The past rates are compound annual growth over one, three, five and seven years, taken from a weekly price series that we store and refresh every Monday. They are the record, not a projection, and the spread between them is the useful part: seven year and one year figures on the same screen usually disagree violently.

power law: log10(price) = 5.82 × log10(days since 3 Jan 2009) - 17.02

Those two constants are fitted here over the whole stored series, back to September 2014, rather than copied from a chart. The fit has an R squared of 0.92 on log scaled data, which sounds better than it is, because almost anything that rises over time will fit a rising line on a log scale.

Read the power law number carefully. Bitcoin currently trades well below the fitted line, so the headline figure quietly contains two separate claims: that the line keeps rising at its historical slope, and that price climbs back to it. The tool now shows the slope on its own underneath, along with how far below the line price sits. At the time of writing the full number is about 41 percent a year over ten years, of which roughly 30 points is the slope and the rest is the assumption that the gap closes. If you do not believe the gap closes, use the smaller number.

The adoption line asks a simpler question: if roughly three times as many people hold Bitcoin in ten years and the price scales with that, what annual return does it imply. It is written as a multiple rather than as a move between two ownership percentages because estimates of how many people hold Bitcoin today disagree with each other by a wide margin, and only the ratio changes the answer.

The digital gold line asks what return is implied if Bitcoin reaches half the value of all the gold ever mined. That figure comes from the World Gold Council’s estimate of about 216,265 tonnes above ground, priced at the latest gold price we hold, so it moves as gold moves. An earlier version of this page used a fixed figure that gold had long since left behind, which understated this reference by several points a year.

None of the four is a forecast, and they disagree with each other on purpose. If they all pointed at the same number it would mean the assumptions behind them were doing no work.

Where every number comes from

InputSourceNotes
REIT dividend yieldMSCI US REIT index factsheetRefreshed monthly.
Infrastructure dividend yieldMSCI World Infrastructure index factsheetRefreshed monthly.
Treasury bill and bond yieldsFRED, US Treasury constant maturityRefreshed on each page load.
Expected inflation10-year breakeven rate via FREDThe gap between Treasury and inflation-linked yields.
Rental growth, inflation linkage, real growthPortfolio Lab assumptionsStated above.
Gold holding cost, term premiumPortfolio Lab assumptions0.4% and 0.5% respectively.
Broad money, US and Japan and UKWorld Bank FM.LBL.BMNY.CNConverted at World Bank annual average exchange rates.
Broad money, ChinaPeople's Bank of China, Depository Corporations SurveyMonthly, because the World Bank publishes China only once a year and late.
Broad money, euro areaEuropean Central Bank, M3The World Bank carries no euro aggregate.
Long-run gold price historydatahub.io London monthly priceUsed for the ratio history back to 1977.
Private equity leverage, hedge fund beta and alphaPortfolio Lab assumptions, following AQR and Ibbotson1.2x, 0.4x and 0.5% respectively.
Private equity starting indexOur own US small cap forecastAQR measured the 1.2 beta against public small caps.
Hedge fund starting indexOur own US large cap forecastIbbotson measured the 0.4 beta against broad equities.
Bitcoin spot price and market capCoinGeckoRefreshed on each page load.
Bitcoin weekly price historyYahoo Finance, BTC-USD from September 2014Refreshed every Monday.
Bitcoin power law constantsFitted by us over the stored seriesRefitted whenever the price series updates.
Above-ground gold stockWorld Gold Council, end 2024216,265 tonnes, priced at the latest gold price held.

What this cannot tell you

The bear and bull cases for infrastructure, commodities and gold are fixed steps up and down rather than anything derived. They give a sense of range and should not be read as scenarios anybody has modelled.

None of these forecasts includes fund charges or tax, and commodity and gold funds are often more expensive to own than share funds.

The REIT and infrastructure figures are for listed funds you can buy on an exchange. Directly owned property behaves differently, is valued far less often, and is much harder to sell.

Above all, three of these five assets have most of their return coming from a price nobody can forecast. Treat the cash and property numbers as reasonably grounded, and the commodity and gold numbers as little more than a statement that they should roughly keep pace with prices.

Related reading. The bond methodology covers the Fixed Income tab, which is the most reliable part of the forecaster. The equity methodology covers shares, including how accurate that kind of forecast has been.
Portfolio Lab is a research tool. Nothing on this page or in the forecaster is investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Forecasts are estimates and will be wrong to some degree.